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This page is a compilation of recent developments in our firm’s Practice Areas. Updates are presented chronologically below. To sort by Practice Area, select a Practice Area from the menu at left.

Madren v. Bradford, 2008 WL 1930539 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4379, decided April 30, 2008.

A buyer and seller entered into a contract to buy and sell real estate. The transaction did not close on the closing date specified in the contract because the seller was performing renovations on the house situated on the property. In e-mails to the seller that were sent both before and after the specified closing date, the buyer inquired about when an appraiser could look at the house and when closing could take place. After the renovations were complete, the seller notified the buyer, who responded that he no longer wished to purchase the property. The seller sued the buyer for breach of contract and specific performance. The buyer moved to dismiss on the grounds that the seller had no contractor’s license, but the trial court denied the motion and awarded damages to the seller. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the buyer’s “no contractor’s license” defense was not appropriately pled as an affirmative defense, that evidence that the buyer expressed continued interest in the transaction beyond the specified closing date was sufficient to support a finding that he waived the closing date requirement, and that the trial court properly calculated the seller’s damages.

Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
Docket No. 07-21, decided April 28, 2008.

Numerous plaintiffs challenged the constitutional validity of an Indiana statute requiring in-person voters to present government-issued photo identification to verify their identity. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute was not facially invalid, but the justices differed in their reasoning. Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy found that Indiana had a valid interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process, that the photo identification requirement was a rational method of preventing voter fraud, and that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to satisfy their heavy burden of persuasion in seeking to invalidate the statute in all its applications. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito found the plaintiff’s argument that the photo identification requirement might impose special burdens on some voters irrelevant. In their view, the statute’s universally applicable requirements were eminently reasonable because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification was not so significant an increase over the usual voting burdens as to overcome Indiana’s interest in preventing voter fraud.

USAA Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 2008 WL 1848393 (S.C. 2008).
Opinion No. 26476, decided April 28, 2008.

A passenger was killed in a single-vehicle accident. The driver was the owner of the vehicle and was driving with a suspended license. The mother of the deceased passenger filed a wrongful death and survival action against the driver and his father. The father’s insurer filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it did not have a duty to defend the plaintiff’s claims because the driver was not named as an insured on the father’s insurance policy, he was not a resident of his father’s home, and his vehicle was not listed as a covered vehicle on the insurance policy. The circuit court granted the father partial summary judgment, holding that the insurer had a duty to defend the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that the insurer had no duty to defend because the policy specifically excluded coverage for the ownership of a vehicle other than the father’s covered automobiles, which did not include the driver’s vehicle. Furthermore, neither the driver nor his father met the definition of “covered person” under the policy. The driver was not a “family member” of his father because he did not resident in his father’s household, and the father did not “own,” “maintain,” or “use” the driver’s vehicle. Finally, even if the father could be deemed a “covered person,” he was not potentially liable for a claim of negligent entrustment arising from the negligent use of a non-covered automobile by someone other than the insured.

Whitworth v. Window World, Inc., 2008 WL 1848360 (S.C. 2008).
Opinion No. 26474, decided April 28, 2008.

An employee was injured in an automobile accident while driving to a job site. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, arguing that because he was transporting a piece of equipment necessary to perform his work to the job site, his injuries were compensable under the duty or task exception to the coming and going rule. Under the going and coming rule, an employee’s injuries are not compensable if sustained while the employee is going to or coming from the place where his work is to be performed. Under the duty or task exception to the rule, an employee will not be precluded from receiving benefits where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment. The single commissioner, the Full Commission, and the circuit court found that the employee’s injuries were not compensable under the going and coming rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the finding that the employee’s injuries were not compensable. The court found that the mere fact that the employee, while going to work, was carrying equipment necessary to the employment did not, in itself, convert the trip into a part of the employment.

Hoard v. Roper Hospital, Inc., 2008 WL 1848424 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4377, decided April 24, 2008.

A young child and her parents filed this medical malpractice action against a radiologist alleging that the child suffered severe brain damage as a result of an improperly placed umbilical vein catheter. The plaintiffs alleged that the radiologist should have notified someone that the catheter was improperly placed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the radiologist, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. The court found that the plaintiffs had provided adequate expert testimony that the radiologist violated the standard of care by failing to information anyone that the catheter was improperly placed. The court also found that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the radiologist’s violation of the standard of care proximately caused the child’s injuries because the jury could have chosen not to believe the testimony of another doctor whose testimony established an intervening cause.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Turner, 2008 WL 1848419 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4376, decided April 23, 2008.

A buyer purchased a piece of property at a foreclosure sale for $3,000.00. The mortgagee moved to set aside the sale because, among other reasons, the sale price was so low as to “shock the conscience of the court.” A special referee granted the motion and set aside the sale. On appeal, the buyer argued that the special referee erred in setting aside the sale because the mortgagee had not presented any evidence of the value of the property. However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the special referee did not abuse his discretion because there was evidence that the principal amount of the mortgage was approximately $85,000.00, and thus there was sufficient evidence to support the special referee’s finding that the foreclosure sale price was grossly inadequate.

RRR, Inc. v. Toggas, 2008 WL 1848305 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4375, decided April 23, 2008.

The defendants contracted with a rental company to rent their beachfront condo to guests. When a dispute arose between the parties, the defendants made telephone calls to and left voicemail messages for the rental company’s employees using profane and threatening language. The defendants also made calls to the Chamber of Commerce, the sheriff’s department, the local newspaper, and the South Carolina Real Estate Commission. The rental company filed suit against the defendants after its business began to decline. A few months prior to trial, the defendants’ attorney was granted his request to withdraw from representation. The defendants did not hire a new attorney and proceeded pro se. When the case was called for trial, the Clerk of Court sent notice to the defendants, but they did not appear for trial. The jury entered a verdict against the defendants, whose subsequent motions to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment (for lack of notice) were denied. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the defendants had notice of the trial and that they were not entitled to have the judgment set aside for excusable neglect. The court also found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by determining that the jury’s award of damages was appropriate given the defendants’ conduct. Finally, the court held that the defendants’ argument that there is no private right of action for unlawful use of a telephone was not preserved for appellate review.

Wieters v. Bon-Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital, Inc., 2008 WL 1848294 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4374, decided April 23, 2008.

A physician’s medical staff privileges were summarily suspended by his employer hospital. After the hospital reported the physician’s suspension to the National Practitioner Data Bank, as required by federal law, the physician sued the hospital and various hospital personnel for defamation. During depositions, the physician’s lawyer asked two witnesses to describe the circumstances that led to the suspension of other physicians during their service on peer review committees, but the defendants’ lawyers instructed them not to answer any such questions. The trial court issued an order compelling the witnesses to answer the questions and the defendants appealed. The South Carolina Court of Appeals noted that discovery orders are generally not immediately appealable, but held that in light of McGee v. Bruce Hospital System, 312 S.C. 58, 439 S.E.2d 257 (1993), in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a discovery order compelling a hospital to produce credentialing files was immediately appealable, the trial court’s discovery order in this case was likewise immediately appealable. On the merits, the court held that the Peer Review Statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 40-71-20, protected the requested information from discovery, and therefore the court reversed the discovery order.

Partain v. Upstate Automotive Group, 2008 WL 1848209 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4373, decided April 23, 2008.

The plaintiff negotiated with a dealer for the purchase of a vehicle. During the negotiations, he test drove the vehicle several times. After signing the purchase paperwork and driving the vehicle home, he discovered that it was not the vehicle that he had test-driven and intended to buy. He subsequently filed a claim against the dealer under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. The dealer moved to dismiss the action and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the purchase agreement. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the lawsuit to proceed, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there was a “significant relationship” between the plaintiff’s claim and the purchase agreement. Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff’s allegations against the dealer were not “illegal and outrageous acts that were unforeseeable to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal business dealings.” Therefore, the court held that the dispute must be submitted to arbitration.

Smith v. Breedlove, 2008 WL 1833640 (S.C. 2008).
Opinion No. 26471, decided April 21, 2008.

The defendant, who had never before been in the construction industry, built a home for himself and his family in Hilton Head. He chose not to hire a general contractor, but instead hired an architect and various contractors himself. He was listed as the owner and general contractor on many of the construction documents and paid the service providers directly. Several years after moving into the home, the defendant sold the home to the plaintiff, who later discovered several defects in the home. She brought causes of action for negligence and breach of implied warranty of workmanship. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim because the defendant was not a builder in the business of building new homes for sale. The court upheld summary judgment for the defendant on the negligence claim because the defendant built the home for himself and his family alone and did not have a duty to the plaintiff or anyone else with regard to the construction of the home.

Stanley v. Atlantic Title Ins. Co., 2008 WL 1833449 (S.C. 2008).
Opinion No. 26470, decided April 21, 2008.

After discovering that a portion of his property contained a septic drainage field which serviced another parcel of land, the plaintiff brought this action for damages against his title insurance company. At trial, the parties presented widely differing views on the method to be used in valuing the plaintiff’s damages. The master-in-equity adopted the plaintiff’s viewpoint and awarded appropriate damages. On appeal, the title insurance company argued that the master had applied the wrong measure of damages, but presented a very different valuation method that the one it had argued for at trial. Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the title insurance company’s valuation argument had not been preserved for appellate review and affirmed the master’s ruling.

Robinson v. Estate of Harris, 2008 WL 1834718 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4372, decided April 18, 2008.

Numerous plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title on a piece of heirs’ property, including a 0.5-acre tract that had been foreclosed upon and sold at a judicial sale. The tract was subsequently re-sold to a third party. The plaintiffs requested the foreclosure be set aside because of ineffective service of process on the mortgagors of the tract at the time it went into foreclosure. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the current owner of the tract because of his status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-870. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that even if service of process on the mortgagors of the tract was improper, the good-faith purchaser of the tract at the judicial sale was not affected by the irregularities in the proceedings.

Spence v. Wingate, 2007 WL 5126153 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4370, decided April 17, 2008.

The life insurance benefits of a deceased congressman were divided between the congressman’s widow and his four sons. However, the widow believed the benefits should have been distributed exclusively to her. She filed this legal malpractice action against the attorneys for her deceased husband’s estate, alleging negligence, professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. The trial court granted the attorneys’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-109, the attorneys had no duty to the widow with respect to her husband’s life insurance policy. On appeal, the widow argued that the attorneys’ owed her a duty based on their prior representation of her in another matter, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals declined to address the issue because it had not been ruled upon by the trial court and was thus not preserved for appellate review.

U.S. v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S.Ct. 1511 (2008).
Docket No. 07-308, decided April 15, 2008.

Several coal companies paid taxes on exports under a portion of the Internal Revenue Code which was later ruled unconstitutional and sought refunds of the taxes. Under I.R.C. § 7422(a), a taxpayer seeking a refund of unlawfully assessed taxes must file an administrative claim with the Internal Revenue Service before filing suit against the government itself. If the taxpayer fails to do so, any suit against the government is barred by the statute. The companies filed the proper administrative claims and received refunds for the taxes paid from 1997-1999, but because the time for administrative claims for taxes paid in years prior to 1997 had passed, the companies sought relief directly from the Court of Federal Claims for taxes paid from 1994-1996. The Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the claims to go forward despite the fact that the companies had not first sought administrative relief. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statute clearly requires a taxpayer seeking a refund of unlawfully assessed taxes to file a timely administrative claim prior to bringing suit.

In re Jordan, 521 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2008).
Docket No. 06-2154, decided April 3, 2008.

A debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and the Bankruptcy Court issued an administrative order directing the debtor not to “sell, transfer, remove, destroy, mutilate or conceal any of [her] property[.]” One week after she was discharged from bankruptcy, the debtor refinanced her home. The bankruptcy moved to revoke her discharge on the grounds that she had violated the administrative order by “transferring” her property. The Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor’s noncompliance was not “willful” but that her intent was a non-issue under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A), and therefore the court revoked the discharge. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that because the statute requires that for a discharge to be revoked, the debtor must be shown to have “refused” to comply with an order. A finding that she “failed” to comply is insufficient. Thus, the debtor’s noncompliance must have been willful and intentional in order to support revocation of her discharge. The court found that because the administrative order did not clearly prohibit refinancing, and because the debtor could not have been expected to know that a refinancing was technically a “transfer,” the debtor’s failure to comply was not willful. Thus, the court reversed the revocation of discharge.

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