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This page is a compilation of recent developments in our firm’s Practice Areas. Updates are presented chronologically below. To sort by Practice Area, select a Practice Area from the menu at left.

Kiriakides v. School Dist. of Greenville County, 382 S.C. 8, 675 S.E.2d 439 (2009).
Opinion No. 26621, decided March 30, 2009.
Practice Areas: Real Estate

A school district notified a property owner of its intent to institute eminent domain proceedings against his property. However, the school district never field the condemnation action with the court because the property owner filed this action challenging the school district’s right to condemn his property and seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The school district subsequently abandoned its condemnation efforts. After a bench trial, the master-in-equity ruled in favor of the school district on the grounds that the property owner’s claims were moot and that in any event he could not establish inverse condemnation. However, the master awarded attorneys’ fees to the property owner. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the mere threat of a taking was not enough to establish inverse condemnation. The court also held that the master had not abused his discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to the property owner.

Cribb v. Spatholt, 382 S.C. 490, 676 S.E.2d 714 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4520, decided March 24, 2009.
Practice Areas: Litigation

In 2005, Edward Cribb was hired as a consultant for a restaurant in Calabash, North Carolina. Just over one year later, he was terminated from his position and filed this action against the restaurant and its owners, asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, all of whom were residents of North Carolina. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Edward’s contract was “to be performed” in South Carolina, at least partially, and therefore that South Carolina courts could properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803(7).

Cribb v. Spatholt, 382 S.C. 475, 676 S.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4519, decided March 24, 2009.
Practice Areas: Litigation

In 2005, Buddy Cribb was hired as the general manager of a restaurant in Calabash, North Carolina. Just over one year later, he was terminated from his position and filed this action against the restaurant and its owners, asserting multiple causes of action including breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, all of whom were residents of North Carolina. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Buddy’s contract with the restaurant was not “to be performed” in South Carolina but was merely negotiated in South Carolina. The court also held that while the “power” prong of the jurisdictional due process analysis was satisfied because the restaurant had sufficient “minimum contacts” with South Carolina, exercising jurisdiction over the case would offend due process because adjudication of the case in South Carolina would not be fair to the defendants.

Floyd v. C.B. Askins & Co. Contractors, 382 S.C. 84, 675 S.E.2d 450 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4500, decided March 24, 2009.
Practice Areas: Workers' Compensation

The claimant sustained a serious, physical brain injury in a bulldozer accident. The claimant, his employer, and the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier stipulated that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled and entered into a consent order awarding the claimant lifetime benefits, which the parties agreed amounted to 987.48 weeks of benefits. The claimant received 254 weeks of benefits but then died from an unrelated aneurism. The claimant’s wife claimed she was statutorily entitled to the balance of the claimant’s benefits and the single commissioner agreed. The Appellate Panel affirmed the award of benefits but limited the amount to the balance of 500 weeks, and the circuit court affirmed the Appellate Panel’s decision. On appeal, the claimant’s wife argued that she was entitled to the balance of 987.48 weeks of benefits. The South Carolina Court of Appeals found that the governing statute actually did not entitle the claimant’s wife to any of the claimant’s unpaid benefits but affirmed the circuit court’s award of the balance of 500 weeks of benefits as the law of the case because the employer and carrier had not appealed that ruling.

Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 675 S.E.2d 431 (2009).
Opinion No. 26619, decided March 23, 2009.
Practice Areas: Estate Planning, Legal Malpractice Defense

Approximately one month before her death, the decedent engaged an attorney to prepare her estate planning documents. A few days before becoming completely nonresponsive, the decedent provided a completed estate planning questionnaire to the attorney, but the attorney did not draft a will in time for execution before the decedent’s death. As a result, the decedent’s estate passed through intestacy, and several individuals whom the decedent had contemplated as beneficiaries brought this malpractice action against the attorney for failure to timely draft a will. The trial court dismissed the case and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. Relying on settled principles of South Carolina case law, as well as reported decisions from other states, the court adamantly rejected the plaintiffs’ invitation to impose on attorneys a duty in favor of non-client prospective beneficiaries to draft wills in a timely manner.

Tennant v. Beaufort County School Dist., 381 S.C. 617, 674 S.E.2d 488 (2009).
Opinion No. 26616, decided March 16, 2009.
Practice Areas: Workers' Compensation

A special education teacher suffered a panic attack, was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, and sought workers’ compensation benefits. The single commissioner, Full Commission, and circuit court, as well as the South Carolina Court of Appeals, held that the teacher had not suffered a compensable injury. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, noting that in order to recover for a mental injury caused solely by emotional stress, the teacher was required to show that she was exposed to unusual and extraordinary conditions in her employment and that those unusual and extraordinary conditions were the proximate cause of a mental disorder. Because substantial evidence in the record supported a finding that the teacher’s panic attack was caused by a personnel conflict that was not atypical in her line of work, the court held that the teacher was not entitled to receive benefits.

Slavchev v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 559 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2009).
Docket No. 07-2036, decided March 11, 2009.
Practice Areas: Litigation

The plaintiff, a Bulgarian citizen, sued his former employer, a cruise line, for breach of contract and related claims arising out of an alleged oral contract to provide him compensation for a disability he suffered during his employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the cruise line on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a contract. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted that because the cruise line was incorporated in Liberia, the case involved a claim by an alien against a corporation with dual citizenship, and therefore held that federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was not complete diversity between the parties.

Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009).
Docket No. 07-689, decided March 9, 2009.
Practice Areas: Election Law

In 2003, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a redistricting plan which divided Pender County between two state house districts. Pender County representatives challenged the plan in state court, arguing that it violated the state constitution’s “Whole County Provision,” which prohibits the splitting of counties in the drawing of legislative districts. The state defended the plan on the grounds that splitting Pender County was necessary to increase the percentage of minority voters in one of the districts. The state claimed that this was necessary to give minority voters the potential to join with majority voters to elect the minority group’s candidate of its choice and that otherwise the minority group’s voting strength would be diluted in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the plan and ordered the General Assembly to redraw the district lines. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while § 2 sometimes requires the creation of “majority-minority” districts, it does not require the creation of so-called “crossover districts” in which the minority population does not constitute a numerical majority but could, with sufficient crossover votes from the majority population, elect the candidate of its choice.

Spence v. Wingate, 381 S.C. 487, 674 S.E.2d 169 (2009).
Opinion No. 26613, decided March 9, 2009.
Practice Areas: Appellate

In Spence v. Wingate, 378 S.C. 486, 663 S.E.2d 70 (Ct. App. 2008), the widow of a deceased congressman appealed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants, the attorney’s for her deceased husband’s estate, in her legal malpractice action. She argued that the attorneys owed her duties based on their prior representation of her in another matter, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals declined to address the issue because it had not been ruled upon by the trial court and was thus not preserved for appellate review. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the widow was not required to file a Rule 59(e) motion to preserve the issue for review because the trial court’s finding that the attorneys owed her “no duty or obligation” sufficiently addressed her arguments in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the court held that the issue was indeed reserved for appellate review and remanded to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on the merits.

Jordan v. Kelly Co., 381 S.C. 483, 674 S.E.2d 166 (2009).
Opinion No. 26611, decided March 9, 2009.
Practice Areas: Workers' Compensation

A truck driver suffered a heart attack shortly after completing a long-haul route from Virginia to Texas. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that the heart attack resulted from the extremely stressful nature of this particular haul because he was forced to drive without the necessary permits and construction required him to take an illegal route through downtown Houston. The single commissioner awarded benefits but the Full Commission reversed. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Full Commission and reinstated the single commissioner’s order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the Full Commission’s denial of benefits. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the Full Commission’s determination that the truck driver was not performing his duties under unusual or extraordinary circumstances and was therefore not entitled to benefits.

Moore v. Barony House Restaurant, LLC, 382 S.C. 35, 674 S.E.2d 500 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4480, decided March 3, 2009.
Practice Areas: Products Liability

The driver of a golf cart was killed in a collision with an SUV while driving the golf cart, which was not equipped with lights, on a public highway at night. Representatives of the driver’s estate sued the golf cart’s manufacturer, asserting strict liability on the grounds that the golf cart was unreasonably dangerous in light of its foreseeable use and negligence on the grounds that the manufacturer failed to warn against nighttime operation on public roads. The trial court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the because the risk of operating an unlighted golf cart on a public highway at night was open and obvious, the golf cart was not defective or unreasonably dangerous and the manufacturer had no duty to warn against the potential hazards of the driver’s conduct.

Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 674 S.E.2d 154 (2009).
Opinion No. 26606, decided March 2, 2009.
Practice Areas: Litigation, Products Liability

A vehicle was involved in a fatal accident after the tread of its left rear tire separated from the tire, allegedly causing the vehicle to roll over. In the products liability action that followed, the plaintiffs sought to compel the defendant tire manufacturer to reveal its proprietary skim stock formula used in manufacturing tires. The trial court ordered the manufacturer to reveal the formula, and the manufacturer sought immediate review by the South Carolina Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction. The court found that the circumstances justified the rare immediate review of a discovery order and subsequently reversed the trial court. The court held that a three-part balancing test that incorporates a “relevant and necessary” standard governs the discovery of trade secrets. The information sought must be relevant not only to the general subject matter of the litigation but also to the specific issues involved in the litigation. Moreover, the party seeking the information must demonstrate with specificity how the lack of the information presents a real, unjust threat to the party’s presentation of its case on the merits. Applying these principles, the court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to discovery of the manufacturer’s skim stock formula.

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Barnes, Alford, Stork & Johnson, LLP makes this information available as a service to its clients and friends. This information is not a solicitation or an effort to provide legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. The information provided should not be relied upon without consulting a qualified attorney to determine if it is applicable to a specific legal need.