This page is a compilation of recent developments
in our firm’s
Practice Areas. Updates are presented chronologically below. To sort
by Practice Area, select a Practice Area from the menu at left.
Skiba
v. Gessner, 374 S.C. 208, 648 S.E.2d 605 (2007).
Opinion No. 26363, decided July 23, 2007.
Practice Areas: Mechanic's Liens
The plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien after
the defendant failed to pay him for lot clearing work. The trial court
originally dismissed the case on the ground that a contractor’s
license was required to do the work, and thus pursuant to S.C. Code
Ann. § 40-11-370 he could not enforce the mechanic’s lien.
Upon reconsideration, the trial court found that the work was merely
landscaping, not preparation for construction, and therefore a license
was not required. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that even if
the work was landscaping and therefore a license was not required,
the plaintiff was still barred from enforcing the mechanic’s
lien because S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-10(a) provides that in order
to enforce a mechanic’s lien, a person must perform or furnish
labor or materials that are actually used in the erection, alteration,
or repair of a building or structure upon real estate. Because landscaping
is not the “erection, alteration, or repair of a building or
structure,” no mechanic’s lien could attach to the defendant’s
property.
Cohen’s
Drywall Co. Inc. v. Sea Spray Homes, LLC, 374 S.C. 195, 648 S.E.2d
598 (2007).
Opinion No. 26360, decided July 23, 2007.
Practice Areas: Mechanic's Liens
The plaintiff filed a mechanic’s lien against the defendants’ property,
but the defendants subsequently posted a cash bond to release the property
from the lien. The plaintiff filed suit to enforce the bond within
the six month time period required by S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-120,
naming the property as the subject of the enforcement action. When
the plaintiff learned that a bond had been posted, it amended its complaint
to name the bond the subject of the enforcement action. The amendment
occurred outside the six month time period and the defendants moved
to dismiss on that basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the mechanic’s lien statute did not require the amendment of
the complaint and allowed the plaintiff’s suit to go forward
because it was originally filed well within the required time period.
Bostic
v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 375 S.C. 143, 650 S.E.2d 479
(Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4278, decided July 18, 2007.
Practice Areas: Collections, Real Estate
A property owner paid off a mortgage on a piece
of property but never received any payoff documents. Four months
after the payoff, the property owner filed suit against his mortgage
company alleging breach of contract and violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-310. Section 29-3-310 requires
that a mortgagee, at the request of a mortgagor who has paid off his
loan, must record satisfaction of the mortgage. The penalty for noncompliance
is $25,000 or half of the original mortgage loan amount, whichever
is less. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the term “request,” as
used in the statute, does not require a written request, but merely
one that informs the mortgagee of the mortgagor’s desire for
the satisfied mortgage to be recorded. Because the property owner merely
sent a payoff check but never actually requested satisfaction to be
filed, the court held that he was not entitled to statutory damages.
Gadson
v. ECO Services of South Carolina, Inc., 374 S.C. 171, 648 S.E.2d 585
(2007).
Opinion No. 26357, decided July 16, 2007.
Practice Areas: Personal Injury
The plaintiff was injured in a car accident and brought claims for
negligent entrustment against the corporate owner of the car and the
employee to whom it had provided the car. The plaintiff claimed that
both defendants knew that the driver of the car presented an unreasonable
risk to others and therefore were negligent in allowing him to drive.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated that our courts do not
follow the Restatement of Torts with respect to negligent entrustment,
but instead require the plaintiff to prove three elements in a negligent
entrustment case: (1) knowledge of or knowledge imputable to the owner
that the driver was either addicted to intoxicants or had the habit
of drinking; (2) the owner knew or had imputable knowledge that the
driver was likely to drive while intoxicated; and (3) under these circumstances,
the entrustment of a vehicle by the owner to such a driver. The court
found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence establishing the
first element as to either defendant.
Three
S Delaware, Inc. v. DataQuick Information Systems, Inc., 492 F.3d 520
(4th Cir. 2007).
Docket No. 06-1227, decided July 12, 2007.
Practice Areas: Alternative Dispute Resolution
The plaintiff submitted claims to arbitration
and the defendant filed counterclaims. The plaintiff walked out of
the arbitration proceedings and the arbitrator subsequently awarded
the defendant $6.1 million on its counterclaims. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court’s denial of
the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award because
the plaintiff could not show that the award violated one of the grounds
specified in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), or
one of certain limited common law grounds, such as where an award fails
to draw its essence from the contract or the award evidences a manifest
disregard of the law.
Bradley
v. Doe, 374 S.C. 622, 649 S.E.2d 153 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4274, decided July 6, 2007.
Practice Areas: Insurance Coverage
The plaintiff was driving late at night when
he swerved to avoid an unknown object in the road and struck a tree,
suffering injuries. He brought a “John Doe” action to collect damages under
the uninsured motorist provision of his automobile insurance. Though
he presented multiple witnesses and affidavits tending to show that
there was a white garbage bag in the road at the time of the accident,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that he did not satisfy the
requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-170, which provides that
if the accident was not caused by contact with an unknown vehicle,
the plaintiff must present an affidavit from a third party witness
to the accident. Because there were no third party witnesses, the plaintiff
could not produce the required affidavit, and therefore the court upheld
summary judgment against the plaintiff.
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