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This page is a compilation of recent developments in our firm’s Practice Areas. Updates are presented chronologically below. To sort by Practice Area, select a Practice Area from the menu at left.

New Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 667 S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4433, decided August 27, 2008.
Practice Areas: Alternative Dispute Resolution

A contractor entered into an agreement with a church to oversee the construction of a new church facility, and the church paid the entire $25,000 fee in advance. Subsequently, the church filed this declaratory judgment action alleging that the agreement was invalid because it was not properly authorized by church personnel and the signatures on the agreement were forgeries. The contractor moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the agreement, but the circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the church did not specifically challenge the arbitration provision, but instead challenged the validity of the entire agreement, the dispute was subject to arbitration.

Colleton Preparatory Academy, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 379 S.C. 181, 666 S.E.2d 247 (2008).
Opinion No. 26535, decided August 25, 2008.
Practice Areas: Personal Injury

Under the “economic loss rule,” there is generally no tort liability for a defective product if the product damages only itself. South Carolina has rejected this rule in the residential home building context, holding that if a homebuilder violates a legal duty aside from his contractual duties, he may be held liable in tort even if the loss is solely economic (i.e. no person has been injured because the damage is to the home itself). In this case, answering a certified question from a federal district court, the South Carolina Supreme Court extended this exception to the economic loss rule to protect commercial parties in addition to home buyers. Therefore, a manufacturer may now be held liable in tort if its products pose a “serious threat of physical harm,” even if no physical harm has actually been sustained and the damage has been limited to the product itself. In order to provide direction as to when the exception applies, the court adopted a balancing test, holding that the nature of the damage threatened and the probability that the damage would occur should be examined to determine whether there is a “clear, serious, and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.” The court also held that a remote user of a product may maintain a claim under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act against a manufacturer despite the lack of privity.

Sloan v. Dep’t of Transportation, 379 S.C. 160, 666 S.E.2d 236 (2008).
Opinion No. 26534, decided August 25, 2008.
Practice Areas: Construction Law

The South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) contracted for the widening of a public road in Charleston County, but the contractor failed to complete the work on schedule. In order to have the work completed as quickly as possible, SCDOT terminated its agreement with the contractor for convenience and subsequently entered into a new agreement with a new contractor. However, in entering into the new agreement, SCDOT did not comply with the competitive bidding procedures generally required by state law. SCDOT maintained its actions were justified under the “emergency procurement” provision of the bidding statute. A taxpayer challenged SCDOT’s actions, alleging that no emergency existed which would justify bypassing the competitive bidding requirements. The circuit court granted summary judgment to SCDOT, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain meaning of the term “emergency” as informed by the state Procurement Code, a sudden, immediate threat to public health, welfare, or safety was required in order to invoke the emergency procurement provision. Therefore, the court held that SCDOT’s emergency procurement was invalid.

Sanders v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 379 S.C. 554, 666 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4432, decided August 19, 2008.
Practice Areas: Workers' Compensation

An employee fell and injured her knee while at work. She sought and received workers’ compensation benefits for her injury. Twenty months after she was released from treatment, the employee fell down a flight of stairs in her home. Attributing the fall to a condition brought on by the original injury, the employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for her second injury even though it occurred at her home. The single commissioner found that the second injury was causally related to the original injury and awarded benefits. The Appellate Panel reversed, finding that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury. The circuit court reversed the Appellate Panel and reinstated the single commissioner’s order. However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Appellate Panel’s order. The court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Appellate Panel’s finding that the second injury was the result of an independent intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation from the original injury.

Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150, 666 S.E.2d 230 (2008).
Opinion No. 26532, decided August 18, 2008.
Practice Areas: Landlord-Tenant

A landlord and tenants entered into a residential lease agreement for a term of 12 months. The agreement provided that upon the expiration of the lease period, the tenants could continue to lease the property on a month-to-month basis provided that they give thirty days notice prior to moving. After the initial lease period had expired and the lease had become month-to-month, a dispute arose between the landlord and tenants. The landlord sent the tenants several communications requesting that they leave the property. After receiving no response, the landlord filed this ejectment action. The magistrate granted summary judgment to the landlord and ordered the eviction of the tenants. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that though the agreement did not explicitly provide for it, the landlord had a statutory right to terminate the month-to-month tenancy upon thirty days written notice. Therefore, the court found that the tenants’ occupancy of the property after proper notice of termination of the tenancy was grounds for eviction.

Hatcher v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 379 S.C. 549, 666 S.E.2d 294 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4431, decided August 14, 2008.
Practice Areas: Alternative Dispute Resolution

The plaintiff opened a Roth IRA with the defendant and deposited over $100,000 into the account. Subsequently, the majority of those funds were withdrawn without his permission into the account of a third person. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA). The defendant moved to compel arbitration based on a broadly-worded arbitration provision in the parties’ agreement, but the circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed as to the breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding that those claims alleged a breach of the parties’ agreement and were therefore subject to arbitration. However, the court affirmed as to the negligence and SCUTPA claims, holding that under Aiken v. World Finance Corp. of South Carolina, 373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007), the arbitration provision could not be applied to alleged actions which were completely outside the expectations of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement.

Zurcher v. Bilton, 379 S.C. 132, 666 S.E.2d 224 (2008).
Opinion No. 26531, decided August 11, 2008.
Practice Areas: Litigation

The plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a physical altercation at an automobile dealership. As a result, the plaintiff was charged with assault and battery. He entered an Alford plea—a plea of guilty accompanied by an assertion of innocence—and was assessed a fine. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in the plaintiff’s civil action, in which the plaintiff asserted several causes of action, including assault and battery, all of which hinged on whether the plaintiff had assaulted the defendant. The trial court entered summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the entry of a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding collaterally estops the party from litigating the issue in a subsequent civil action based on the same facts underlying the plea. The fact that the plaintiff’s plea was an Alford plea made no difference.

Willis v. Wukela, 379 S.C. 126, 665 S.E.2d 171 (2008).
Opinion No. 26530, decided August 7, 2008.
Practice Areas: Election Law

The incumbent mayor of Florence, Frank Willis, lost the 2008 Democratic Primary election to a challenger, Stephen Wukela, by a single vote. Willis timely filed a protest, but the state Democratic Party upheld the election results and certified Wukela as the winner. On appeal, the circuit court upheld the party’s determination, and Willis sought an expedited appeal before the South Carolina Supreme Court. Wukela moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, which the court granted. The court found that by statute, the winner of the election had to be certified by August 15. Because the Florence County Election Commission would need at least thirty days to prepare for and conduct a new election, as stated in an affidavit from the director of the commission, any court order requiring a new election needed to be issued on or before July 17. Therefore, because Willis’s appeal was filed after that date, the court dismissed the appeal as moot, leaving in place the party’s certification of Wukela as the winner.

CACI Premier Technology, Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280 (4th Cir. 2008).
Docket No. 06-2140, decided August 5, 2008.
Practice Areas: Personal Injury

The plaintiff, a federal government contractor that provides intelligence services to the military, filed this defamation action against a radio talk show host and multiple other defendants. The plaintiff claimed that the talk show host falsely blamed it for the abuses which took place at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff—an admitted public figure—could not show constitutional actual malice on the part of the talk show host, that the talk show host’s statements were not demonstrably false, and that many of the allegedly defamatory statements did not assert actual facts about the plaintiff. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conducted a thorough examination of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the military investigations regarding the scandal, and the talk show host’s allegedly defamatory statements. The court concluded that the statements either were not made with reckless disregard for the truth or that that they did not state actual facts about the plaintiff. Therefore, the court held that the statements were protected by the First Amendment and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

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Barnes, Alford, Stork & Johnson, LLP makes this information available as a service to its clients and friends. This information is not a solicitation or an effort to provide legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. The information provided should not be relied upon without consulting a qualified attorney to determine if it is applicable to a specific legal need.