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• Workers’ Compensation

This page is a compilation of some of the recent developments in our firm’s Practice Areas. To check for updates in your area of interest, simply click on the Practice Area to your left.

Workers’ Compensation

Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transp. Co., 382 S.C. 295, 676 S.E.2d 700 (2009).
Opinion No. 26646, decided May 4, 2009.

A long-haul truck driver was killed in an automobile accident while driving his tractor-trailer, and his widow sought workers’ compensation benefits from the trucking company. The trucking company defended on the grounds that the driver was an independent contractor. The Workers’ Compensation Commission, the circuit court, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals applied the four-factor “right to control” test and found that the driver was an employee in light of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding in Dawkins v. Jordan, 341 S.C. 434, 534 S.E.2d 700 (2000), that the presence of “any single factor is not merely indicative of, but, in practice, virtually proof of, the employment relation.” However, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that the driver was an independent contractor. In the process, the court overruled Dawkins and subsequent cases that had relied on it, holding that the common law “right to control” factors should be evaluated in an evenhanded manner in determining whether the questioned relationship is one of employment or independent contractor.

McCuen v. BMW Manufacturing Corp., 383 S.C. 19, 677 S.E.2d 28 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4531, decided April 15, 2009.

The claimant sought workers’ compensation benefits for injuries allegedly sustained during his employment as a dent removal technician at an automobile manufacturing plant. The single commissioner found that the claimant had suffered accidental injuries to his neck, upper extremities, and hands arising out of his employment. The Appellate Panel affirmed, and the employer appealed only that portion of the award relating to the claimant’s alleged neck injuries. The circuit court affirmed, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the claimant did not develop neck pain until several months after leaving his employment, there was not substantial evidence supporting an award of benefits for neck injuries.

Mead v. Jessex, Inc., 382 S.C. 525, 676 S.E.2d 722 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4525, decided April 2, 2009.

The claimant alleged he was injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation benefits, which his employer initially denied. Three hearings were held. At the first, the single commissioner awarded benefits for the claimant’s right hip and right leg injury. At the second, a different single commissioner awarded benefits for back pain which he found was directly related to the claimant’s original injury. However, he denied benefits for the claimant’s alleged left hip injuries because the claimant failed to prove that they were related to the original injury. Neither party appealed the findings of the first or second single commissioners. At the third hearing, yet another single commissioner awarded benefits for a change in condition to the claimant’s left hip arising out of the original injury. The Appellate Panel reversed, finding that the claimant’s claim for benefits related to his left hip was barred by res judicata because the unappealed finding of the second single commissioner that the claimant’s left hip injuries were unrelated to the original injury was the law of the case. The circuit court reversed the Appellate Panel, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Appellate Panel’s decision, finding that res judicata barred the claimant from relitigating the alleged injuries to his left hip.

Floyd v. C.B. Askins & Co. Contractors, 382 S.C. 84, 675 S.E.2d 450 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4500, decided March 24, 2009.

The claimant sustained a serious, physical brain injury in a bulldozer accident. The claimant, his employer, and the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier stipulated that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled and entered into a consent order awarding the claimant lifetime benefits, which the parties agreed amounted to 987.48 weeks of benefits. The claimant received 254 weeks of benefits but then died from an unrelated aneurism. The claimant’s wife claimed she was statutorily entitled to the balance of the claimant’s benefits and the single commissioner agreed. The Appellate Panel affirmed the award of benefits but limited the amount to the balance of 500 weeks, and the circuit court affirmed the Appellate Panel’s decision. On appeal, the claimant’s wife argued that she was entitled to the balance of 987.48 weeks of benefits. The South Carolina Court of Appeals found that the governing statute actually did not entitle the claimant’s wife to any of the claimant’s unpaid benefits but affirmed the circuit court’s award of the balance of 500 weeks of benefits as the law of the case because the employer and carrier had not appealed that ruling.

Tennant v. Beaufort County School Dist., 381 S.C. 617, 674 S.E.2d 488 (2009).
Opinion No. 26616, decided March 16, 2009.

A special education teacher suffered a panic attack, was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, and sought workers’ compensation benefits. The single commissioner, Full Commission, and circuit court, as well as the South Carolina Court of Appeals, held that the teacher had not suffered a compensable injury. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, noting that in order to recover for a mental injury caused solely by emotional stress, the teacher was required to show that she was exposed to unusual and extraordinary conditions in her employment and that those unusual and extraordinary conditions were the proximate cause of a mental disorder. Because substantial evidence in the record supported a finding that the teacher’s panic attack was caused by a personnel conflict that was not atypical in her line of work, the court held that the teacher was not entitled to receive benefits.

Jordan v. Kelly Co., 381 S.C. 483, 674 S.E.2d 166 (2009).
Opinion No. 26611, decided March 9, 2009.

A truck driver suffered a heart attack shortly after completing a long-haul route from Virginia to Texas. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that the heart attack resulted from the extremely stressful nature of this particular haul because he was forced to drive without the necessary permits and construction required him to take an illegal route through downtown Houston. The single commissioner awarded benefits but the Full Commission reversed. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Full Commission and reinstated the single commissioner’s order, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the Full Commission’s denial of benefits. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the Full Commission’s determination that the truck driver was not performing his duties under unusual or extraordinary circumstances and was therefore not entitled to benefits.

Hardee v. McDowell, 381 S.C. 445, 673 S.E.2d 813 (2009).
Opinion No. 26605, decided February 23, 2009.

In Hardee v. McDowell, 372 S.C. 413, 642 S.E.2d 632 (Ct. App. 2007), the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that in order for a general contractor to be eligible to transfer liability for a workers’ compensation claim to the Uninsured Employers’ Fund under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-415, the contractor must collect proof of insurance from its subcontractor for each job the subcontractor performs, regardless of the number of jobs the subcontractor performs in a given year. On certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the court clarified that a contractor must collect proof of insurance from its subcontractor each time the subcontractor is actually hired to perform work.

Barton v. Higgs, 381 S.C. 367, 674 S.E.2d 145 (2009).
Opinion No. 26594, decided February 9, 2009.

In Barton v. Higgs, 372 S.C. 109, 641 S.E.2d 39 (Ct. App. 2007), the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court’s determination that a general contractor could transfer its liability for workers’ compensation benefits to the South Carolina Uninsured Employers’ Fund despite the fact that the Certificate of Insurance provided to the general contractor by a subcontractor was not signed. The fund had argued that the certificate’s lack of a signature meant that it was not a standard form acceptable to the Workers’ Compensation Commission as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-415. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the fund and reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that by failing to collect a signed certificate, the general contractor failed to meet the requirements of section 42-1-415 and its implementing regulation.

Pack v. S.C. Dep’t of Transportation, 381 S.C. 526, 673 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4488, decided January 27, 2009.

The claimant was a driver with the South Carolina Department of Transportation’s roadside herbicide application crew. After exposure to liquid herbicide fumes, she collapsed and suffered various injuries. She sought workers’ compensation benefits from SCDOT, which began paying her temporary benefits. However, she sought a permanent award or a finding that she had not reached maximum medical improvement and was entitled to additional treatment. The single commissioner found that the claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement and that she had ongoing respiratory, psychological, and brain injuries. The Appellate Panel affirmed the single commissioner with an amended finding that the claimant had not suffered brain injuries. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Appellate Panel and reinstated the single commissioner’s award. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court as to the claimant’s respiratory injury, but found that the circuit court had made improper findings of fact as to the brain injury. The court held that the circuit court erred in concluding that there was only one reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence regarding the brain injury, and therefore the court remanded the case to the Workers’ Compensation Commission for further fact-finding on that issue. As to the claim for psychological injuries, the court found that the Commission failed to establish a causal link between the claimant’s physical and psychological injuries and remanded for further fact-finding on that issue as well.

Johnson v. Sonoco Products Co., 381 S.C. 172, 672 S.E.2d 567 (2009).
Opinion No. 26584, decided January 20, 2009.

An employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The single commissioner awarded benefits, but the Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the commission and reinstated the single commissioner’s award. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order, and the South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari. Prior to the conclusion of the appeal in the underlying case, the employee filed motions in the circuit court to compel payment of benefits and for sanctions against the employer. The employer objected on the grounds that the award of benefits was stayed during the appeal and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions absent a remand. The circuit court rejected the employer’s arguments and awarded the requested relief. The employer subsequently paid the benefits, but challenged the award of sanctions on appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the commission’s denial of benefits was reversed and an award made by the circuit court, the award was not stayed by the appeal. The court further held that because the circuit court retains jurisdiction over matters not affected by an appeal, it had the authority to enforce by appropriate sanctions matters not stayed by the appeal, including the award of benefits.

Bartley v. Allendale County School Dist., 381 S.C. 262, 672 S.E.2d 809 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4476, decided January 8, 2009.

The claimant, a special education teacher, sought workers’ compensation benefits after she was inadvertently injured by one of her students during recess. Feeling better, she began teaching in a different school district the following year, noting on a medical questionnaire that she had no bank or joint pain and no chronic illnesses. After a few months in her new position, she began experiencing new symptoms and filed an additional workers’ compensation claim. Her employer resisted the claim, asserting that the claimant’s symptoms began prior to the initial incident as a result of depression. The single commissioner found that the claimant suffered a neck injury from the initial incident, but that the claimant was not disabled as a result of the injury because she resumed working the following school year. The Appellate Panel and Circuit Court affirmed the single commissioner’s findings, as did the South Carolina Court of Appeals. The court held that the claimant failed to carry her burden of proof that her injuries resulted from or were aggravated by the initial incident.

Paschal v. Price, 380 S.C. 419, 670 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4454, decided November 24, 2008.

The claimant, a driver for a repossession company, was paralyzed from the waist down in an automobile accident after the vehicle he was towing blew a tire and caused him to lose control of his own vehicle. Almost two years later, the claimant sought workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the accident. His employer denied that the claimant was an employee, asserting that he was an independent contractor, however the single commissioner found that the claimant was an employee and awarded benefits. The Appellate Panel and circuit court affirmed the single commissioner’s findings, as did the South Carolina Court of Appeals. The court applied the “right to control” test and determined that a preponderance of the evidence indicated that the claimant was an employee. The court also rejected the claimant’s argument that the employer’s notice of appeal to the circuit court was untimely because it did not initially contain a civil action cover sheet. The court found that the omission of the cover sheet was a non-prejudicial clerical error which did not destroy an otherwise timely and legitimate appeal.

Ardis v. Combined Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 313, 669 S.E.2d 628 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4441, decided October 14, 2008.

An employee attended a conference in Atlanta which was sponsored by his employer. Because he would have arrived home after dark had he left Atlanta immediately following the conclusion of the conference, the employee, at his employer’s expense, spent the night after the conference ended in a hotel. During the night, a fire broke out in the hotel, and the employee died as a result of smoke inhalation. His mother initiated a workers’ compensation claim, which the employer resisted on the grounds that the employee’s death did not arise in the course and scope of his employment. The Single Commissioner awarded benefits, and the Appellate Panel and circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that because the employee would not have been in the hotel on the night of the fire except as a result of his attendance at an employer-sponsored conference, his death arose in the course and scope of his employment and was therefore compensable.

Sanders v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 379 S.C. 554, 666 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4432, decided August 19, 2008.

An employee fell and injured her knee while at work. She sought and received workers’ compensation benefits for her injury. Twenty months after she was released from treatment, the employee fell down a flight of stairs in her home. Attributing the fall to a condition brought on by the original injury, the employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for her second injury even though it occurred at her home. The single commissioner found that the second injury was causally related to the original injury and awarded benefits. The Appellate Panel reversed, finding that the second injury was not causally related to the original injury. The circuit court reversed the Appellate Panel and reinstated the single commissioner’s order. However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Appellate Panel’s order. The court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Appellate Panel’s finding that the second injury was the result of an independent intervening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation from the original injury.

Johnson v. Beauty Unlimited Landscape Co., 379 S.C. 403, 665 S.E.2d 656 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4414, decided June 17, 2008.

An employee developed a traumatic cataract in his right eye after he was struck by a tree limb while working for a landscaping company. An ophthalmologist removed the cataract and implanted an artificial lens, which restored the employee’s vision to 20/30. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits for 100% loss of the use of his right eye on the basis that he had lost all natural use of his eye, a condition which was remedied only by the implanted artificial lens, which he characterized as a “corrective lens.” However, the single commissioner and the Appellate Panel awarded benefits for only a partial loss of vision, based on the employee’s 20/30 vision without contacts or glasses. Further, the Appellate Panel specifically found that the employee’s implanted artificial lens was not a “corrective lens.” The circuit court affirmed the Appellate Panel’s order, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals also affirmed. The court agreed with the Appellate Panel that there is a significant difference between removable contacts or glasses and an implanted artificial lens. The court also rejected the employee’s argument that the term “corrective lens” should be construed broadly in favor of coverage, noting that while courts should evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant, they may not stretch the Workers’ Compensation Act and regulations to extend benefits to a claimant who no longer suffers a disability.

Houston v. Deloach & Deloach, 378 S.C. 543, 663 S.E.2d 85 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4408, decided June 10, 2008.

An employee was injured when the dump truck in which he was riding as a passenger was involved in an accident. The employer denied workers’ compensation benefits on the grounds that the employee had not been authorized to permit the driver of the truck to drive the truck. The single commissioner awarded benefits, but the Appellate Panel reversed, agreeing with the employer that the driver of the truck was unauthorized and therefore the employee’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court affirmed the Appellate Panel’s order, and on appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals also affirmed. The court found that there was substantial evidence to support the Appellate Panel’s finding that the driver of the truck was unauthorized and that the employee, by permitting the unauthorized driver to drive the truck, had thereby deviated from his employment. Therefore, the employee’s injuries were not compensable.

Whitworth v. Window World, Inc., 377 S.C. 637, 661 S.E.2d 333 (2008).
Opinion No. 26474, decided April 28, 2008.

An employee was injured in an automobile accident while driving to a job site. He sought workers’ compensation benefits, arguing that because he was transporting a piece of equipment necessary to perform his work to the job site, his injuries were compensable under the duty or task exception to the coming and going rule. Under the going and coming rule, an employee’s injuries are not compensable if sustained while the employee is going to or coming from the place where his work is to be performed. Under the duty or task exception to the rule, an employee will not be precluded from receiving benefits where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment. The single commissioner, the Full Commission, and the circuit court found that the employee’s injuries were not compensable under the going and coming rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the finding that the employee’s injuries were not compensable. The court found that the mere fact that the employee, while going to work, was carrying equipment necessary to the employment did not, in itself, convert the trip into a part of the employment.

Doe v. S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities and Special Needs, 377 S.C. 346, 660 S.E.2d 260 (2008).
Opinion No. 26465, decided March 24, 2008.

A nurse sought workers’ compensation benefits for an allegedly stress-related mental injury resulting from the deterioration of her work environment brought on by an increase in the number of “aggressive patients” housed at her facility. The single commissioner denied the claim, and the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed the denial. However, the circuit court reversed, finding that the Commission’s order was unsupported by substantial evidence because there was evidence of “extraordinary and unusual conditions” in the claimant’s employment. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Commission’s findings, but the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s finding that the Commission’s order was unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the case to the Commission to award benefits to the claimant.

Turner v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Environmental Control, 377 S.C. 540, 661 S.E.2d 118 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4353, decided March 10, 2008.

A state employee injured her back during a fire drill at work and sought workers’ compensation benefits. The South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Single Commissioner and the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission that the employee had sustained a 30% permanent partial disability to her lower back. The court found that the Commission’s factual findings were sufficiently detailed and that they were supported by substantial evidence. The court also rejected the employee’s argument that her own physicians should be designated the authorized physicians, reiterating the principle that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not give a unilateral right to claimants to select their treating physician. Finally, the court remanded for a hearing on the issue of reimbursement of the employee’s medically related travel expenses.

McKinney v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 376 S.C. 636, 658 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4348, decided February 25, 2008.

An employee sustained work-related injuries and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. She argued that she, rather than her employer, should be allowed to select her treating physician, but both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit court found that the employer should select the treating physician. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not give claimants the unilateral right to select their treating physician and hold their employer and its carrier responsible for payment for the treatment.

Thompson v. Cisson Construction Co., 377 S.C. 137, 659 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4339, decided February 1, 2008.

An injured employee sought and received workers’ compensation benefits for physical injuries he sustained on the job. Over two years later, the employee committed suicide and his mother sought death benefits under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-290, arguing that the employee’s on-the-job injuries aggravated a pre-existing psychiatric condition which led to his eventual suicide. The single commissioner and the full Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded death benefits, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s reversal of the commission’s award. The court held that the plain language of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-60, which provides that “[n]o compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned . . . by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself”, clearly barred an award of death benefits where it was determined that the employee had a “willful intent” to kill himself.

Foggie v. General Electric Co., 376 S.C. 384, 656 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4330, decided January 10, 2008.

A machine operator was injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation benefits, but his employer disputed the extent of the injury and denied the employee’s assertion that he was totally and permanently disabled. The claim was heard before a single commissioner and appealed to the full commission and then to the circuit court, which partially affirmed the commission’s decision but remanded for further fact-finding on two issues. The employee sought review by the South Carolina Court of Appeals, but that court dismissed the appeal based on the longstanding principle that an order of the circuit court remanding a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is not directly appealable. Because the circuit court did not finally decide the case on the merits, its order was not immediately appealable.

Jones v. Harold Arnold's Sentry Buick, 376 S.C. 375, 656 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4328, decided January 3, 2008.

An employee’s fault generally has no bearing on his or her right to recover workers’ compensation benefits. However, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-60 provides an exception to the general rule, barring recovery where the injury results from the employee’s intoxication. In this case, the claimant was an admitted cocaine addict but was undergoing voluntary counseling. He was injured in two falls at his workplace on subsequent days and sought workers’ compensation benefits. The employer denied his request, alleging that he was intoxicated at the time of his falls. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and circuit court, holding that evidence that the employee tested positive for cocaine on the date of his first fall and that he had exhibited physical symptoms associated with cocaine use was sufficient to support the denial of benefits based on the affirmative defense of intoxication.

Curiel v. Environmental Management Services, 376 S.C. 23, 655 S.E.2d 482 (2007).
Opinion No. 26409, decided December 20, 2007.

An employee sustained injuries when he was struck in the right eye while doing demolition work for his employer. The employee was an admitted illegal alien worker, and the employer argued that a federal law prohibiting the hiring of illegal aliens preempts a South Carolina statute permitting the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to illegal alien workers. The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on a similar case from North Carolina, held that there is no evidence that Congress intended to preempt state policy on this issue and that awarding workers’ compensation benefits to illegal alien workers does not conflict with the federal policy of not hiring them in the first place.

Hall v. Desert Aire, Inc., 376 S.C. 338, 656 S.E.2d 753 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4324, decided December 20, 2007.

The national sales manager for a large equipment manufacturer flew to Arkansas on a business trip for a meeting with several local sales agents. While at the meeting, which took place in one of the local agent’s homes, the participants consumed alcoholic beverages. After dinner, the national sales manager and one of the local agents continued their business discussions while driving around the block. Their vehicle overturned and the national sales manager suffered multiple injuries for which he sought workers’ compensation benefits. The employer argued that the employee’s injuries did not arise out of and within the course and scope of his employment. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and circuit court, holding that evidence that the employee’s actions were for the sole purpose of pursuing his employer’s duties and that the employee frequently conducted his employer’s business in the context of entertaining was sufficient to find that his injuries arose out of and were within the course and scope of his employment.

McGriff v. Worsley Companies, Inc., 376 S.C. 103, 654 S.E.2d 856 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4313, decided November 27, 2007.

A sales clerk was cleaning his store’s parking lot when he noticed a friend, who was driving a truck, pull up at the intersection next to the store. The clerk walked out into the road and spoke briefly with his friend about the friend’s pending employment application with the store. As the clerk turned to return to the store, he was struck by a passing vehicle. The employer argued that the clerk’s injuries did not arise out of the clerk’s employment and did not occur within the course and scope of his employment. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and circuit court, holding that evidence that the clerk was allowed to and expected to be outside the store as part of his duties and that the employer encouraged employees to recruit new workers was sufficient to find that the clerk’s injuries arose out of and were within the course and scope of his employment.

Callahan v. Beaufort County School Dist., 375 S.C. 92, 651 S.E.2d 311 (2007).
Opinion No. 26377, decided September 4, 2007.

The plaintiff was exposed to dangerous chemicals at her workplace. She simultaneously sought workers’ compensation benefits and sued a third party for the same injuries, but did not provide notice of the third party action within thirty days as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-560(b). The South Carolina Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the statute is required in order to receive workers’ compensation benefits, but that because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the third party action, her workers’ compensation claim could go forward despite her noncompliance.

Robbins v. Walgreens and Broadspire Services, Inc., 375 S.C. 259, 652 S.E.2d 90 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4291, decided August 24, 2007.

The plaintiff suffered a workplace injury and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. He later applied for additional benefits based on a change of condition under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-90, which occurs when a claimant experiences a change in physical condition after the first award but as a result of the original injury. The Workers’ Compensation Commission denied the claim, and on appeal the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission’s decision.

Pressley v. REA Const. Co., Inc., 374 S.C. 283, 648 S.E.2d 301 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4266, decided June 27, 2007.

An employee suffered a serious injury which rendered him a paraplegic. The employer and the insurance company admitted that the injury was compensable and agreed to pay lifetime benefits. The main point of contention was whether the Workers’ Compensation Commission had the authority to order the insurance company to bear the base cost of providing the employee with a wheelchair accessible mobile home. The South Carolina Court of Appeals found that while state law permits the commission to require the insurer to pay for the increased costs of wheelchair accessible housing, it does not confer the authority to force the insurer to provide an injured employee with a mobile home.

Shuler v. Tri-County Elec. Co-op., Inc., 374 S.C. 516, 649 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4256, decided June 18, 2007.

A trustee of an electric co-op sough sought workers’ compensation benefits for injuries he sustained while traveling to a national convention, but the co-op denied the claim, contending that he was not an employee. The South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the claim upon examination of the statutory definition of employee, the Electric Cooperative Act, and the co-op’s bylaws, finding that the trustee was not entitled to compensation for services rendered and therefore was not an employee entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

 Hernandez-Zuniga v. Tickle, 374 S.C. 235, 647 S.E.2d 691 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4253, decided June 14, 2007.

The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he suffered while working for a painting contractor. The contractor argued that he was not an “employer” within the jurisdiction of the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act because he did not regularly employ four or more employees. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed and held that the contractor was not within the jurisdiction of the Act.

Oxendine v. Davis, 373 S.C. 438, 646 S.E.2d 143 (2007).
Opinion No. 26331, decided May 21, 2007.

A construction worker who lived in North Carolina was injured while working on a job in North Carolina. The employer argued that the employee was not entitled to coverage under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the “base of operations” test, which provides that a worker’s employment is located at the employer’s place of business to which he reports, from which he receives his work assignments, and from which he starts his road trips, regardless of where the work is performed. Under this test, the court found that there was coverage because multiple factors indicated that the employee’s employment was in South Carolina.

Hill v. Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 645 S.E.2d 424 (2007).
Opinion No. 26330, decided May 21, 2007.

A truck driver for an Alabama trucking company was injured when his truck overturned in Virginia. The employer argued that the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission did not have jurisdiction over the claim because the employee was not hired in South Carolina and because the employer did not have four or more employees in South Carolina. Furthermore, the employer argued that some of the employee’s injuries were not compensable because they occurred in the hospital and not as a result of the accident. The South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the place of hiring turns on where the employment contract was entered into. Because the employee filled out the employment application in South Carolina and accepted the job over the phone in South Carolina, the court held that he was hired in South Carolina. The court also found numerous facts indicating that the employer had four or more employees in South Carolina and substantial evidence supporting the commission’s finding that the employee’s injuries arose out of and within the scope of his employment.

Hopper v. Terry Hunt Const., 373 S.C. 475, 646 S.E.2d 162 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4238, decided April 23, 2007.

A general contractor attempted to transfer liability for a workers’ compensation claim to the Uninsured Employers’ Fund. The general contractor had requested and received proof of insurance from its subcontractor, but the documentation showed that the subcontractor only had workers’ compensation insurance in Georgia, not South Carolina. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that in order to transfer liability, S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-415 requires contractors to receive proof of workers’ compensation insurance in South Carolina. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the general contractor knew that its subcontractor was insured only in Georgia, the court held that the general contractor had not complied with § 42-1-415 and was not entitled to transfer liability to the Uninsured Employers’ Fund.

Forrest v. A.S. Price Mechanical, 373 S.C. 303, 644 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4227, decided April 2, 2007.

An injured employee agreed with his employer on monthly workers’ compensation benefits of $490, an amount based on the employee’s wages at the time of the injury. The Workers’ Compensation Commission increased the amount to $532.72 and the employer appealed, claiming that the employee was barred by the doctrines of estoppel and laches from claiming benefits higher than agreed upon and that South Carolina law mandated benefits equal to the employee’s wages. The South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. The doctrines of estoppel and laches did not apply because the commission may adjust a claimant’s compensation rate after the filing of the claim. Furthermore, the court found that exceptional circumstances justified deviation from the usual benefits computation method in order to fairly reflect the employee’s lost future earnings.

Porter v. Labor Depot, 372 S.C. 560, 643 S.E.2d 96 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4212, decided March 5, 2007.

The central issue in this case was whether a workers’ compensation claimant had an employer-employee relationship with the defendant company at the time of the claimant’s injury. The South Carolina Court of Appeals, while noting that the workers’ compensation statutes should generally be construed in favor of coverage, upheld the denial of benefits to the claimant in light of the fact that he failed to offer any documentary evidence of employment such as wage receipts, check stubs, copies of completed applications, W-2 forms, or copies of income tax returns.

Grant v. Grant Textiles, 372 S.C. 196, 641 S.E.2d 869 (2007).
Opinion No. 26267, decided February 20, 2007.

This case involved the common question of whether the claimant’s injuries arose out of and within the course of his employment. The claimant was on the way to meet with clients when he stopped to remove an animal carcass from the road and was subsequently struck by a passing vehicle. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the claimant’s act, while outside of his regular duties, was undertaken in good faith to advance his employer’s interests and was therefore within the course of his employment.

Hardee v. McDowell, 372 S.C. 413, 642 S.E.2d 632 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4206, decided February 12, 2007.

A general contractor attempted to transfer liability for a workers’ compensation claim to the Uninsured Employers’ Fund. The general contractor had requested and received proof of insurance from its subcontractor at the beginning of the year, but it did not request such proof prior to hiring the subcontractor to work on the job in question. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-415 requires a contractor to collect proof of insurance from its subcontractor for each job the subcontractor performs, regardless of the number of jobs the subcontractor performs in a given year. The South Carolina Supreme Court later clarified that a contractor must collect proof of insurance from its subcontractor each time the subcontractor is actually hired to perform work. See Hardee v. McDowell, 381 S.C. 445, 673 S.E.2d 813 (2009).

Geathers v. 3V, Inc., 371 S.C. 570, 641 S.E.2d 29 (2007).
Opinion No. 26254, decided January 29, 2007.

This case involved a “successive-carrier problem” where an employee suffered successive work place injuries with an intervening change of insurance carriers by the same employer. The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the “last injurious exposure rule” to solve this problem. This rule places full liability upon the insurance carrier covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury bearing a causal relation to the disability. Thus, the carrier in place at the time of the second injury bears full liability for the second injury even if the second injury would have been much less severe had the first injury not occurred. However, if the second injury is merely a recurrence of the first injury, then the carrier in place at the time of the original injury remains liable for the second.

Barton v. Higgs, 372 S.C. 109, 641 S.E.2d 39 (Ct. App. 2007).
Opinion No. 4197, decided January 16, 2007.

South Carolina law allows a general contractor to transfer liability for workers’ compensation benefits to the South Carolina Uninsured Employers’ Fund when it relies on the false representations of a subcontractor that it is covered by workers’ compensation insurance. In this case, the fund argued that a general contractor should not be allowed to transfer liability to the fund because the Certificate of Insurance provided to the general contractor by a subcontractor was not signed and was therefore not a standard form acceptable to the Workers’ Compensation Commission as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-415. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision that the statute did not require the form to be signed. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court later reversed, holding that by failing to collect a signed certificate, the general contractor failed to meet the requirements of section 42-1-415 and its implementing regulation. See Barton v. Higgs, 381 S.C. 367, 674 S.E.2d 145 (2009).

 

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