• Alternative Dispute Resolution
  
• Appellate
  
• Banking
  
• Bankruptcy
  
• Business Litigation
  
• Church Law
  
• Collections
  
• Construction Law
  
• Contract Law
  
• Corporate Law
  
• Estate Planning
  
• Fidelity & Surety Law
  
• Hospital and Medical
  Malpractice Defense
  
• Insurance Coverage
  
• Landlord - Tenant
  
• Legal Malpractice Defense
  
• Litigation
  
• Mechanic’s Liens
  
• Military Law
  
• Nursing Home Liability Defense
  
• Personal Injury
  
• Premises Liability
  
• Products Liability
  
• Probate Law
  
• Professional Liability
  
• Real Estate
  
• Retirement Plans
  
• Taxation
  
• Workers’ Compensation

This page is a compilation of some of the recent developments in our firm’s Practice Areas. To check for updates in your area of interest, simply click on the Practice Area to your left.

Hospital and Medical Malpractice Defense

Guinan v. Tenet Healthsystems of Hilton Head, Inc., 383 S.C. 48, 677 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2009).
Opinion No. 4543, decided May 7, 2009.

The plaintiff brought this medical malpractice action against a hospital and several doctors, alleging that the doctors failed to properly diagnose and treat his hematoma. At the conclusion of the discovery period, which was extended multiple times, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that discovery was incomplete and that his expert’s testimony had established genuine issues of material fact. However, the South Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery and that he had failed to provide expert testimony showing that the defendants had departed from generally accepted standards of care or that any alleged departure had proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Wogan v. Kunze, 379 S.C. 581, 666 S.E.2d 901 (2008).
Opinion No. 26542, decided September 8, 2008.

A widow filed suit against a gastroenterologist alleging several causes of action, including negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, based on the doctor’s alleged failure to file Medicare claims for her deceased husband. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment on those causes of action, and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that even though the widow characterized her claims as state common law claims, they were “inextricably intertwined” with the doctor’s alleged failure to comply with the federal Medicare Act. Therefore, because the federal law did not allow a private right of action, the widow’s claim was not cognizable on state common law grounds.

Snavely v. AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., 379 S.C. 386, 665 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4413, decided June 12, 2008.

A patient filed this action against a hospital and emergency room physician, alleging that the defendants violated patient-physician confidentiality by revealing diagnosis information to the patient’s brother and sister-in-law. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding that the patient had voluntarily involved her brother and sister-in-law in every stage of her examinations and diagnosis, and therefore that she had tacitly consented to disclosure of her medical condition. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had not erred in finding that the patient had consented to disclosure. Furthermore, the court rejected the patient’s arguments that the hospital was contributorily negligent, that there were factual discrepancies in the record, and that publication of her medical condition was an invasion of privacy.

Hoard v. Roper Hospital, Inc., 377 S.C. 503, 661 S.E.2d 113 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4377, decided April 24, 2008.

A young child and her parents filed this medical malpractice action against a radiologist alleging that the child suffered severe brain damage as a result of an improperly placed umbilical vein catheter. The plaintiffs alleged that the radiologist should have notified someone that the catheter was improperly placed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the radiologist, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. The court found that the plaintiffs had provided adequate expert testimony that the radiologist violated the standard of care by failing to information anyone that the catheter was improperly placed. The court also found that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the radiologist’s violation of the standard of care proximately caused the child’s injuries because the jury could have chosen not to believe the testimony of another doctor whose testimony established an intervening cause.

Thomas v. Dootson, 377 S.C. 293, 659 S.E.2d 253 (Ct. App. 2008).
Opinion No. 4358, decided March 13, 2008.

The plaintiff’s mouth was severely burned during surgery by an overheated surgical drill. He subsequently filed this medical malpractice action against the surgeon. The circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of the surgeon at the close of the plaintiff’s case, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the parties had stipulated that the drill was overheated and there was testimony in the record that the surgeon had notice that the drill was hot, a directed verdict was inappropriate. The court remanded for a new trial, noting also that it was error for the circuit court to exclude certain testimony regarding the notice issue because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Linog v. Yampolsky, 376 S.C. 182, 656 S.E.2d 355 (2008).
Opinion No. 26419, decided January 14, 2008.

The plaintiff underwent osseous gum surgery, a highly invasive dental procedure. During the surgery, an anesthesiologist administered sedatives to the plaintiff, but he failed to fully sedate her. As a result, she intermittently moved her head and mumbled during the procedure. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action, alleging medical battery as a cause of action on the basis that she had withdrawn her consent during the procedure. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that in light of the availability of a medical malpractice claim or a civil battery claim to any patient that is injured by a physician, medical battery would constitute an unnecessary and superfluous cause of action. Therefore, the court held that South Carolina does not recognize an independent cause of action for medical battery. In order for a patient to pursue a claim stemming from a situation involving lack of or revocation of consent, the patient must bring the claim under the ordinary medical malpractice framework.

Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007).
Opinion No. 26323, decided May 7, 2007.

The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of his minor son, a sexual abuse victim, alleging that two doctors were negligent in failing to report to authorities or warn future victims of the perpetrator’s predilection for child molestation. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the case, finding that the child abuse reporting statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-510, does not create a private right of action for negligence per se and that the doctors did not have a common law duty to report because the perpetrator presented only a general threat (i.e. there was not a specific threat of harm to a readily identifiable third party).

Vaughan v. McLeod Regional Medical Center, 372 S.C. 505, 642 S.E.2d 744 (2007).
Opinion No. 26285, decided March 12, 2007.

A man was injured in an automobile accident and declared permanently incapacitated by a court-appointed medical examiner in a guardianship proceeding. Two months later, he was declared to be no longer incapacitated. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that S.C. Code Ann. § 44-66-70(A) did not provide immunity for the examiner because the examiner was not a person entitled by statute to make health care decisions for the incapacitated patient. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for the examiner and hospital based on common law immunity. The court held that court-appointed examiners in guardianship proceedings have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions and opinions within the scope of the appointment.

 

Barnes, Alford, Stork & Johnson, LLP makes this information available as a service to its clients and friends. This information is not a solicitation or an effort to provide legal advice, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. The information provided should not be relied upon without consulting a qualified attorney to determine if it is applicable to a specific legal need.